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ABSTRACT
The 2013 National Security Agency revelations of perva-
sive monitoring have lead to an “encryption rush” across
the computer and Internet industry. To push back against
massive surveillance and protect users privacy, vendors, ho-
sting and cloud providers have widely deployed encryption
on their hardware, communication links, and applications.
As a consequence, the most of web traffic nowadays is en-
crypted. However, there is still a significant part of Internet
traffic that is not encrypted. It has been argued that both co-
sts and complexity associated with obtaining and deploying
X.509 certificates are major barriers for widespread encryp-
tion, since these certificates are required to established en-
crypted connections. To address these issues, the Electronic
Frontier Foundation, Mozilla Foundation, and the Universi-
ty of Michigan have set up Let’s Encrypt (LE), a certificate
authority that provides both free X.509 certificates and so-
ftware that automates the deployment of these certificates.
In this paper, we investigate if LE has been successful in
democratizing encryption: we analyze certificate issuance in
the first year of LE and show from various perspectives that
LE adoption has an upward trend and it is in fact being suc-
cessful in covering the lower-cost end of the hosting market.
1. INTRODUCTION
The 2013 National Security Agency (NSA) revelations of
pervasive monitoring and surveillance had a significant im-
pact on the Internet industry. As a reaction, we have wit-
nessed a surge on deployment of encryption technologies
to curb these surveillance practices. For example, Google
enabled encryption in the links between its datacenters [32]
while Apple enabled encryption by default on its mobile de-
vices [10]. The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) –
a body that standardizes Internet-related protocols– issued
RFC 7258 [11], making it clear that “pervasive monitoring
is an attack”.
We have also seen a surge on the encryption of web traffic
in response to these revelations. For example, browser tele-
metry from both Mozilla Firefox and Google Chrome shows
that more than 50% of page loads by their users is curren-
tly encrypted [28, 3]. However, a significant portion of web
traffic is still unencrypted, and it has been argued that both
the complexity and costs associated with obtaining and de-
ploying the required X.509 certificates (issued by third-party
paid certificate authorities – CAs) are major barriers for wi-
de encryption of web traffic [19, p.86]. For example, some
CAs charge 80 USD per certificate, per website per year
and require manual setup.
To address these barriers against ubiquitous encryption,
the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), Mozilla Founda-
tion, and University of Michigan set up Let’s Encrypt [22]
(LE hereafter), a CA that provides both free X.509 certifica-
tes and automated software to configure servers to use those
certificates. By reducing both costs (to zero) and deploy-
ment complexity, LE aims to make encrypted traffic ubi-
quitous, democratizing certificate issuance and deployment.
Little after one year after launch, LE has issued 12 million
certificates – making it to the top three largest CAs [12, 13].
In this paper, we investigate if LE has been successful
in democratizing encryption, and perform a comprehensi-
ve analysis on the issuance of LE certificates. We use as a
starting point one year of data obtained from the Certificate
Transparency (CT) logs [2] and make the following contribu-
tions: looking from various perspectives, we show that LE is
indeed democratizing encryption – we show that 98% of cer-
tificates are issued for domains outside Alexa 1M (§4.2), but
that issuance is not restricted to the lower-cost end of the
market. Moreover, we show that the success of LE is attribu-
ted by the adoption of major players (3 hosting providers are
responsible for 47% of the LE certified domains, §4.3). We
also show that issuance is dominantly for the lower-cost end
of the market (shared hosting, §4.5), and that the majority
of certificates are correctly renewed after their first expira-
tion (90 days, §4.6). For the .nl top-level domain (TLD),
we show that both old and new domains are benefiting from
LE (§4.7). Last, we show that 63% of LE certified doma-
ins are correctly deploying their certificates (§4.8), which is
a lower bound number that we determined by performing
active https scans.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1 SSL/TLS connections and CAs
To illustrate how encrypted traffic on the Web works, con-
sider the following example. In Figure 1, a user’s browser
connects to a web server to retrieve a webpage1. After esta-
1X.509 certificates can actually be used for various applica-
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Figure 1: SSL/TLS connections and CAs
blishing the TCP connection, the client (browser) and server
start the SSL/TLS handshake, which we briefly summarize
here and refer the reader to [6, 20] for more details. The
browser first sends a client hello message (iii), the server
responds with a server hello message and a certificate mes-
sage which includes its public key (iv). Upon receiving the
certificate message, the browser must validate the chain of
certificates [5], and only after this step the SSL/TLS setup
continues and the encrypted connection can be used (v).
However, there are two prior steps necessary to get the
required certificate: an entity has to request a certificate
from the CA for the particular fully qualified domain name
(FQDN) (i). The CA, in turn, issues a certificate (ii), which
is then deployed on the server.
Commercial CAs typically offer three types of certifica-
tes: domain validated, organization validated, and extended
validation certificates. All of them employ the same encryp-
tion measures – they differ on how the CA verifies the user’s
identity (e.g. if the user is the legal owner of the domain and
company for which a certificate is being issued).
Since LE automates issuance, it only provides domain va-
lidated certificates, where a user merely has to prove owner-
ship of the FQDN being certified. LE is the first CA to fully
automate the process of validation and issuance, using the
Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME)
protocol [4].
2.2 Web hosting
Web hosting is the industry that maintains content on the
Web on behalf of customers (either paid or free). Web ho-
sting is offered in various types of services such as shared
versus dedicated hosting, according to customer’s need and
provider’s business plan. In this paper, we are more intere-
sted in studying the adoption of LE the in lower-cost end of
the market, which employs shared hosting.
In shared hosting, a large number of websites are hosted
on the same physical server, typically associated with less
popular websites, allowing them to share the costs. To iden-
tify shared hosts, we use the methodology some of us intro-
duced in [29], in which an IP address is classified as shared
hosting if it hosts more than 10 unique domain names.
3. DATASETS
3.1 Certificate Transparency logs
The certificates issued by LE were obtained from Certifi-
cate Transparency (CT) logs [2], which provide an append-
only log of certificate issuance [21]. LE issued its first cer-
tificate on Sept 2015. Our data therefore contains one year
of certificates based upon CT data (Sept 2015-2016). No-
te that we only consider non-expired certificates given that
an LE certificate expires after 90 days and requires further
renewal.
tions such as e-mail or ssh, but for the sake of simplicity,
we only focus on web traffic here.
For each certificate, we extract their respective FQDNs
from the subjectAltName string. We then transform the-
se FQDNs into a “normalized” domain form, which is de-
fined as either the 2nd–level or 3rd–level if a given TLD
registry provides such registrations (e.g.: example.co.uk or
example.org). Therefore, we do not analyze the number of
certificates issued by LE in this paper, we focus on their
coverage of their “normalized” domain form. For instance,
certificates for a.example.org and b.example.org would be
mapped into one domain (example.org). In the rest of this
paper, we use domains in the sense of “normalized” domains.
3.2 DNSDB
The CT logs only provide information about the domains
that have been issued certificates; it does not include infor-
mation about where these domains are hosted. To determine
that, we need to rely upon DNS data to check which IP ad-
dresses are associated with each of the domains in our data.
Specifically, we use passive DNS logs (Sept 2015-2016) ob-
tained from DNSDB – a passive DNS database provided by
Farsight Security [9]. To our knowledge, DNSDB has the
best coverage of the overall domain name space that is ava-
ilable to researchers. We found that DNSDB contains histo-
rical A records2 for 80% of LE domains. An alternative to
DNSDB would be to have performed DNS lookups for all
domains covered by LE, but the required historical data for
that purpose was not available.
Therefore, we employ DNSDB as a historical sample of the
complete domain space, covering roughly 127–205 million
unique domains monthly.
3.3 Organizations mapping and classification
We map the IP addresses obtained from DNSDB into the
corresponding organizations with which they are hosted. In
short, for each IP address, we retrieve the organization that
this IP is assigned to (or is “allocated” to), using their re-
spective RIR IP whois data and historical Maxmind Geo-
IP2 database [26]. We then use the methodology and key-
words described in our previous work [29] to classify the or-
ganizations according to their business plans: hosting provi-
ders, content delivery networks (CDNs), educational, among
others.
3.4 .nl domain registration information
To determine the domain age of certified LE domains, we
employ registration information provided by the .nl TLD
registry (SIDN). An alternative was to analyze whois re-
cords for all the other zones. However, given the fact that
(i) most of TLDs do not offer historical domain whois se-
rvice, (ii) it cannot be publicly accessed, (iii) and for those
that do offer whois, the format is not standardized [24], we
opt for singling out .nl as a case study.
4. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
4.1 Absolute and relative growth
How big is LE? LE publishes statistics [16] showing a
continuous growth in the number of daily issued certifica-
tes. LE is in fact the third biggest CA, according to other
research [13] and most of its growth comes from sites that
did not have certificates before [12].
2A records are type of DNS records that map domains into
IP addresses [27].
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Figure 2: LE time series for FQDNs, domains, and
DNSDB ratio
Figure 2 shows a time series of the absolute number of
unique LE certified domains, FQDNs, and domains relative
to all domains observed in DNSDB (§3.2). First, we see a
continuous growth in all metrics: by Sept 2016, there were
∼10.4M FQDNs that had LE certificates, amount to ∼4.3M
domains (§3.1), on average 2.5 certificates per domain.
Moreover, to have an idea on how much of the domain
name space uses LE certificates, we use DNSDB as a com-
parison and show that LE is used by 2% of all domains
observed in Sept 2016. Given that LE has been only active
for a year by the time of this analysis, 2% of a large sample
of the domain space represents a significant growth.
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Figure 3: LE certificates issued to Alexa top-ranked
domains
4.2 Popular sites and Let’s Encrypt
Intuitively, one could think that LE would be predomi-
nantly used among less popular domains and that popular
domains would already have their paid certificates deployed,
therefore not using free LE certificates. In this subsection,
we examine this assumption. To do that, we obtain the list
of most popular websites from Alexa [1] and match LE do-
mains against it.
Figure 3 shows a time series of the relative contribution
of Alexa ranked domains (1M, 100K, 10K, 1K) against the
total number of domains with valid LE certificates. The con-
tribution of Alexa 1M domains remains stable around 2% of
total LE usage throughout 2016, a period of relatively rapid
growth of LE issuance. By Sept 2016 about ∼64K domains
ranked in the Alexa 1M use LE (§3.1).
Figure 4 shows a time series of the relative growth of issu-
ance within the Alexa rankings. By Sept 2016, 19% of doma-
ins in the Alexa 1K had at least one certificate issued for a
FQDN under their domain (e.g. subdomain.example.org).
This suggests that admins of 19% of the most popular we-
bsites know about LE ’s existence and use its service, but
they do not necessarily issue and deploy certificates on their
main websites (e.g., both wsj.com and welt.de are labeled
as LE domains, yet do not use LE on their main websites).
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Figure 4: Relative usage of LE domains in Alexa
rankings
Overall, we find that 98% of the certificates are issued for
less popular sites outside Alexa rankings – which is good
for democratizing encryption – and 2% are issued for popu-
lar and resourceful websites, indicating that LE is not only
constrained to the lower-cost share of the market.
4.3 Certificates distribution per organization
Which organizations are using more LE certified doma-
ins? Are there “big players” or the LE domains are distribu-
ted across small organizations? To answer this question, we
use the methodology described in §3.3 and map LE doma-
ins to their respective IP address owners. We calculate size
indicators, by aggregating these mappings per organization.
Figure 5 shows ECDF of LE certified domains per or-
ganization, for four selected months of issuance. We sort
the organizations (x axis) by their size in terms of doma-
ins hosted on allocated IP addresses. Steps in these lines
indicate bulk issuance of LE domains by an organization.
For example, in Jan 2016, we see the large vertical line
corresponding to deployment at Automattic/wordpress.com
(x = 0.5,∆y = 63.5%), which is especially noticeable when
compared against Nov 2016. By Sept 2016, we can obse-
rve three clear steps: Shopify (x = 0.33,∆y = 6%), Au-
tomattic/wordpress.com (x = 0.45,∆y = 22%) and OVH
(x = 0.7,∆y = 19%). All three companies have announced
issuance for their customers and are jointly responsible for
47% of LE certified domains. It is exactly these companies,
serving numerous, smaller customers that would otherwise
not enable the use of encryption by their visitors.
We also find evidence which suggests that LE benefits
smaller organizations. Among all 66K identified organiza-
tions using the methodology explained in §3.3, we find 14K
that have domains certified with LE in Sept 2016. Notably,
9K have 5 or less LE certified domains. This corresponds to
the lower left quadrant of Figure 5d, where smaller organi-
zations are jointly responsible for 23% of all LE domains.
We conclude that LE reaches both large hosting com-
panies as well as smaller organizations with lower domain
concentration.
4.4 Types of organizations
In the previous section, we analyzed the distribution of
LE certified domains per organization. In this section, we
classify these organizations according to their types (§3.3,
[29]). We group organizations into government related, edu-
cational, domain parking, hosting providers, ISPs, CDNs,
DDoS-protection services and others.
The distribution of LE domains per organization cate-
gory is shown in Figure 6. As expected, the majority of
domains are associated with hosting organizations (68% in
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Figure 5: ECDF of LE use versus organization size (domain density, measured in number of associated
domains). The x-axis on bottom has organizations sorted by domain density in ascending order. The y-axis
represents the total number of LE domains issued that month. The x-axis on top represents the total domains
in DNSDB The shaded area indicates domains that are not successfully attributed to an organization.
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Figure 6: Distribution of LE domains per organiza-
tion type (in % of domains)
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Figure 7: Distribution of LE accross shared and non-
shared hosting (in % of domains)
Sept 2016), while the share of DDoS protection services and
CDNs remains low (2% and 0.1%, respectively). Note, ho-
wever, that 29% of all domains were not attributed to any
of the categories (‘unknown’).
4.5 Types of hosting: shared and non-shared
Hosting services typically are offered in multiple types at
different prices. Resources such as CPU, memory, bandwidth
and IP addresses could be dedicated to customers (“dedi-
cated hosting”), or shared among them. Shared hosting is
where prices are at their lowest level and profit margins are
slimmer. Under these conditions, encryption deployment wo-
uld be least expected.
We classify the IP addresses from the hosting organiza-
tions listed in §4.4 into shared and non-shared hosting via
the methodology explained earlier in §2.2 [29].
Figure 7 is a histogram of relative market share within
the hosting segment, split between shared and non-shared
hosting services. We find that from Jan 2016, LE use within
hosting is dominantly connected to shared hosting services,
with a penetration above 90%. Recalling that by Sept 2016
the overall hosting segment is dominant over other types
(67%), we find that LE has very high overall utilization in
shared hosting, which has traditionally been the least likely
candidate for adoption of encryption due to the associated
costs. As in the previous section, we can see that LE covers
the lower-cost end of the market.
4.6 Certification lifetime
Once domains issue an LE certificate, do they keep on
renewing them every 90 days? Or do they let them expire?
To answer this question, we carry out a survival analysis of
LE certificates for each FQDN using a Kaplan-Meier Su-
rvival Estimate [18]. We identify three components that are
likely to influence the outcome of this question: (i) renewal
automation working correctly (not having automation set-
up likely causes renewal failure); (ii) user satisfaction with
the service and its certificates; (iii) the intended lifetime of
the domains themselves.
Figure 8 shows the estimated survival function of LE cer-
tified FQDNs featuring two functions. The continuous func-
tion measures survival without any downtime: survival im-
plies the issuance of certificates with perfectly overlapping
validity periods. The second function measures survival with
a maximum one week gap in between consecutive validity
periods. This accounts for failure in automation, corrected
after the previous certificate expires.
Since all certificates are valid for 90 days, we observe
100%, survivability for this period. After those 90 days we
see drops: domains that either stop being re-certified, whe-
re automation was not successful or that the domain itself
expired. The survival curve noticeably flattens after x =
270 days, indicating that the automation is effective.
The agreement between gap = 0 (continuous) and gap ¬
1 week indicates that beyond initial downtime, further survi-
val is roughly similar. This may be explained by users that
get continuous coverage after successful setup of automa-
tion. With more than 70% FQDN survival after a full year,
we can conclude that the majority of LE users remain loyal
to the service during our measurement period, which is not
surprising given the size (§4.3) and type (§4.4) of LE users
– dominantly (big) hosting providers.
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Figure 8: Survival analysis of LE certificates
 0
 2
 4
 6
 8
 10
 12
 14
 16
 18
Sep '15 Nov '15 Jan '16 Mar '16 May '16 Jul '16 Sep '16
 0
 5
 10
 15
 20
 25
Do
m
ai
n 
Ag
e 
(Y
ea
rs
)
M
on
th
ly
 N
ew
 C
er
ts
 (K
)domain agecertificate #
Figure 9: Median, Q25, Q75 and number of monthly
new certificates for .nl domains
4.7 New vs. old domains
What type of domains are more likely to employ LE cer-
tificates: newly registered domains or older domains? Since
LE reduces the certificate cost to zero while provides full
automation, one could hypothesize that registrars simply
enable them by default on their registrations system, so eve-
ry new domain could be automatically configured with an
LE certificate.
To investigate this hypothesis, we focus on the .nl TLD
as a case study (§3.4). There were 514,986 LE certificates
issued for 191,176 unique FQDNs, during the monitoring
period. In total, there were 85,223 unique .nl domains that
had LE certificates.
Figure 9 shows the number of LE certificates issued for
.nl domains for the first time (continuous line), and the me-
dian age, first quartile (Q25) and third quartile (Q75) (box
plot). As we can see, for all months, the median age of the
domains is above two years, with a large spread, suggesting
that LE is being used both for older and newer domains.
We can conclude that for this dataset, most of LE certi-
ficates are being used on already existing domains. In the
absence of scan data for those domains, we cannot confirm
if they had their first certificate issued by LE, or if they
switched to LE. However, it has been discussed in [12] that
most LE domains did not support encryption prior to their
LE certificate issuance.
4.8 Certificate issuing vs. deployment
So far we have covered the side of certificate issuance.
However, another open question is to determine how many
of these certificates are actually deployed. Answering this
question is not straightforward: first, certificates can be used
for other applications than the Web, such as e-mail or ftp.
Certificates can also be deployed internally within networks
or be used on non-standard ports.
To have a lower-bound estimate of LE certificate deploy-
ment, we randomly select 25,000 FQDNs for certificates that
were valid between Nov 13 and 19, 2016 and scan them on
0 
5k
10k
15k
20k
noDNS
http406error
noTLS
sniError
tlsOK-notLE
tlsOK-LE-Expired
tlsOK-LE-OK
FQ
DN
2465 1422 2143 141
2846
180
15803
Figure 10: Scans of 25,000 LE covered FQDNs
https (TCP port 443) to determine if the certificates are
actively deployed for use on the Web. We perform the scans
on Nov 28, 2016.
Figure 10 shows the scan results. As can be seen, 15,803
(63%) of FQDNs have successfully deployed LE certificates.
The remaining were divided into other errors, such as 2,465
(10%) having no DNS records – e.g. short-lived, possibly
expired; 2,143 (9%) do not support TLS and 1,422 (6%) re-
turn an http error code and are likely not set-up for https in
the first place. Interestingly, 2,846 (11%) deploy certificates
not issued by LE. Here one could hypothesize that either the
hosting provider is waiting for paid certificates to expire or
is just experimenting. In addition, 180 FQDNs had expired
LE certificates.
Our results show that 63% of our sampled FQDNs (as a
lower-bound value) have successfully deployed LE certifica-
tes. For a more comprehensive view on LE deployment, it
is important to perform longitudinal active measurements
over all FQDNs covered by LE.
5. RELATED WORK
The ecosystem for certificates and their use has been ana-
lyzed by various studies, but none of them have singled out
LE and analyzed its impact. For example, there are Internet-
wide scan studies covering certificates [15, 23, 8, 7]. Several
methods with the goal of mapping the CA ecosystem (e.g.:
active scans, Certificate Transparency [2]) have also been
compared [30]. Paid access reports have been previously is-
sued (e.g. [31]).
Although LE is a new player in the CA market, there have
been some preliminary efforts in measuring its adoption. Ho-
wever, none of them have been peer-reviewed at the time of
the writing this paper. For example, there are self-reported
LE statistics pages (e.g. [16]), a blog post by J.C. Jones [17],
and another one by Helme on the LE coverage on the Alexa
1M [14]. The EFF compared the size of LE against other
CAs in their blog post [12]. A technical report by Manousis
et al. [25] analyzed adoption of LE in May 2016, covering the
geo-location of certified domains and use of LE certificates
in malware and typosquatting domains.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that
singles out LE and shows what segments of the market are
using and deploying their certificates. We demonstrate that
LE is democratizing encryption, by being used mostly by
the lower-cost share of the hosting market.
6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
LE has been successful in disrupting the certificate indu-
stry, which has been slow in covering the lower-cost end of
the market. By addressing the two major barriers inhibiting
ubiquitous encryption (cost and complexity required in is-
suing X.509 certificates), LE has become one of the largest
CAs within only one year after its first certificate was issued.
In this paper, we have studied the certificate issuance in
the first year of LE and showed that it has been playing a
major role in democratizing encryption: LE has been widely
used, and mostly by the low-cost share of the market (shared
hosting), which would be unlike to deploy the complex and
costly X.509 certificates before LE.
We have also shown that once these barriers are elimi-
nated, it enables big hosting providers to issue and deploy
certificates for their customers in bulk, thus quickly and au-
tomatically enable encryption across a large number of do-
mains. For example, we have shown that currently, 47% of
LE certified domains are hosted at three large hosting com-
panies (Automattic/wordpress.com, Shopify, and OVH).
The success of LE can also be measured by the fact that
70% of the LE certified domains remain active after the
first issuance of the certificate (LE certificates expire after
three months if not renewed). Also, for one TLD zone (.nl),
we show that LE certificates have been issued not only for
newly registered domains, but also for several-year-old do-
mains, likely benefiting from bulk issuing by their hosting
companies.
Issuing a certificate is only one part of the story for en-
crypted communications: deploying it on the server side is
also of essence. To measure the fraction of deployed LE cer-
tificates, we actively scanned a sample of 25K FQDNs. We
showed that 63% of them are correctly deployed for https,
which is a lower bound value given that these certificates
can also be used for other applications.
As future work, it is important to observe how LE evolves
and how it impacts the CA market, and how cyber criminals
use malicious domains certified by LE.
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